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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past decade, federal governmental regulators have been concerned over the significant growth
in the Individual Retirement Accounts (and Annuities)
(IRA) rollover market, as it is more loosely regulated
as compared to the 401(k) plan market. By the end of
the third quarter of 2021, there were $13.2 trillion of
assets in IRAs, as compared to $7.3 trillion of assets
in 401(k) plans.1 The Employee Benefits Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) is the federal law that
regulates employer-provided retirement plans and
IRAs. As a result of this growth, the following issues
surfaced — both from a federal securities law and an
ERISA law perspective — what are the applicable fiduciary standards and disclosure requirements that
should accompany a financial adviser’s recommendation to roll monies out of a 401(k) plan and into an
IRA rollover, coined by practitioners as ‘‘capturing
the IRA rollover.’’2 Releases from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) have indicated that both the DOL
and the SEC have concerns about the IRA rollover
market.3 Early on, the DOL attempted to subject
broker-dealers to a higher fiduciary standard under
ERISA, than under federal securities law. The DOL
attempted to do so through the issuance of fiduciary
regulations and related prohibited transaction exemptions (PTEs) under ERISA. Those regulations and related exemptions were struck down by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018 on the grounds that the
DOL had exceeded its regulatory powers.4 By 2019,
the SEC issued its Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI),
designed to set forth a new standard of care for
broker-dealers who were providing investment advice,
1
See Ted Godbout, United States Retirement Assets Held
Steady in Third Quarter, NAPA (Dec. 29, 2021).
2
See Fred Reish, Bruce Ashton, Joan Neri, and Joshua Waldbeser, Capturing Plan Rollovers, Plan Consultant (Spring 2014).
3
Broker-dealers that interact with the public generally must become members of FINRA.
4
Chamber of Commerce v. DOL, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018).
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including rollover recommendations.5 That regulation
set forth a best interest standard of care, as well mandating certain disclosures of fees and conflicts of interest. After the SEC’s issuance of Reg. BI, the DOL
publicly stated that any new rulemaking from it would
dovetail with the SEC’s advice.6 The DOL hopes that
it has succeeded with the release of its new interpretation of an investment advice fiduciary and with the
issuance of a new PTE, known as PTE 2020-02.7 This
paper provides a historical background to the DOL’s
attempt to regulate broker-dealers; it analyzes the conditions of PTE 2020-02 and the DOL’s new interpretation of its 1975 regulation defining who is an investment advice fiduciary under ERISA; and it outlines
some of the most common problems that will arise in
complying with PTE 2020-02.
Part II of the article provides some background regarding ERISA’s Title I and II statutory rules on investment advice fiduciaries and the related prohibited
transactions, for those unfamiliar with ERISA. It describes the DOL’s initial regulations, set forth in 1975,
as to who is an investment advice fiduciary. Part III
explains why various government regulators began to
be concerned, during the 1990s, over the exponential
growth of the IRA rollover market and applicable
standards of care and disclosure rules that advisers
should be subject to when recommending a rollover to
a plan participant or beneficiary. It also discusses the
DOL’s investment advice fiduciary rules and its new
PTEs that it set forth during 2010 and 2016. In 2018,
the Fifth Circuit vacated the 2016 fiduciary rules,
sending the DOL back to the drawing board. Part IV
focuses on the DOL’s current 2020 fiduciary rules, including the new PTE 2020-02, effective February 1,
2022. The terms and conditions of that exemption are
discussed in-depth, including common pitfalls that
can occur when attempting to comply with the exemption. Part V ends the article with the author’s conclusion as to how investment advisers should proceed
in light of the current guidance.
5

SEC, Final Rule, Release No. 34-86031, File No. S7-07-18,
Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct,
RIN 3235-AM35, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318 (July 12, 2019). The intent
of Reg BI was not to impose the SEC’s interpretation of the fiduciary duties applicable to investment advisers covered under the
Adviser’s Act; instead, it was limited to the applicable fiduciary
standard for broker-dealers.
6
See News Release, U.S. Department of Labor Announces Exemption To Improve Investment Advice and Enhance Financial
Choices For Workers And Retirees (Dec. 15, 2020).
7
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798 (Dec. 18, 2020).
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II. BACKGROUND ANALYSIS OF
TITLE I’S AND II’S FIDUCIARY AND
PROHIBITED TRANSACTION RULES
A. Limitations of Title I and II of ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA8 to regulate employersponsored retirement plans. As such, it amended Title
29 of the U.S. Annotated Code as it relates to federal
labor laws (as retirement benefits are a form of compensation for an employee’s services), as well as Title
26 as it relates to the I.R.C. (as such plans extend favorable tax treatment to both employees and employers). The rules set forth in Title 29 are provided under
Title I of ERISA, whereas the rules set forth in Title
26 are provided under Title II of ERISA. For someone unfamiliar with ERISA, it is a difficult statute as
it uses different terminology for the same concepts,
different definitions for the same terms, and covers
different types of employee benefit retirement plans.
Thus, the author wishes to provide, in this Part II,
some background regarding Title I and Title II of
ERISA for those unfamiliar with it.
This article focuses on the fiduciary and prohibited
transaction rules applicable under Title I and II of
ERISA. Under Title I of ERISA, such rules govern an
‘‘employee pension benefit plan,’’ defined as any plan,
fund, or program maintained by an employer or by an
employee organization (i.e., a union), or by both, to
the extent it provides retirement income to its employees.9 In contrast, the fiduciary and prohibited transaction rules of Title II of ERISA cover a wider scope of
plans, including an employee pension benefit plan
qualified under I.R.C. §401(a) (which would encompass those plans subject to Title I of ERISA); an individual retirement account under I.R.C. §408(a) or an
individual retirement annuity under I.R.C. §408(b); an
Archer Medical Spending Accounts (MSAs) under
I.R.C. §220(d); a health savings account (HSA) under
I.R.C. §223(d); a Cloverdell education savings account under I.R.C. §530; or a trust or plan determined
by the Treasury Secretary to be described in one of
the preceding provisions.10 Thus, an employersponsored retirement plan that extends tax-preferred
8
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. Title II’s provisions were
codified in title 26 of the United States Code. All section references to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
(‘‘I.R.C.’’ or the Code), or Treasury regulations promulgated
thereunder, unless otherwise indicated. All sections to Title I of
ERISA (the ‘‘ERISA’’), or Labor Department regulations thereunder are labeled as such.
9
ERISA §3(2)(A)(i). Plans that are not covered under this definition include governmental plans, church plans that do not make
an election to be covered under I.R.C. §410(d), and unfunded excess benefit plans maintained for executives. See ERISA §4(b).
10
I.R.C. §4975(e)(1)(A)–§4975(e)(1)(G).

retirement benefits to employees is subject to both
sets of rules in Title I and II of ERISA. Given that retirement benefits are voluntary on the part of an employer, Congress realized that there would be those
employees whose employers would not sponsor such
a plan. To encourage those employees to save for retirement on their own, Congress created IRAs under
I.R.C. §408 (i.e., Title II of ERISA), such that employees could defer a portion of their compensation
without incurring taxes on their original contributions
and on subsequent interest/gains of such funds until
the funds were later distributed. As IRAs are not established nor maintained by an employer, they are not
covered under Title I of ERISA, but are covered under Title II of ERISA due to the tax-preferred status
of such accounts.11
The IRA model was that of a defined contribution
plan model, shifting investment risk and mortality risk
to the individual, as benefits paid from the IRA are
solely from the individual’s account balance. Initially,
the maximum limitations for employer-sponsored defined contribution plans were the lesser of $25,000 or
25% of compensation, considerably higher than the
maximum limitations for an IRA, which were the
lesser of $1,500 or 100% of compensation. As such,
employees without an employer-sponsored plan could
save for retirement, but certainly not at the level provided under an employer-sponsored plan. However,
Congress did provide that an employee under an
employer-sponsored retirement plan could roll those
pension assets out of the employer’s plan and into an
IRA, typically occurring when a participant terminates employment or retires. Such rollover could provide more investment choices for the employee
through the IRA, but the employee would then be
subject to all administrative and investment costs associated with the IRA, as the employer may have
been subsidizing such costs under the employer’s
11
IRAs are exempt from Title I of ERISA, including the reporting and disclosure rules of Part 1, ERISA §101(a); the participation, benefit accrual, and survivor annuity rules of Part 2, ERISA
§201(6); the funding rules of Part 3, ERISA §301(a)(7); and the
fiduciary standards of Part 4, ERISA §401(a). This act may be referred to as ERISA in the text. According to the DOL regulations,
IRAs are generally not employee benefit plans for purposes of
Title I of ERISA, unless they are sponsored by an employer who
does more than facilitate the payroll deduction of contributions to
an IRA. DOL Reg. §2510.3-2(d)(1). The term IRA rollover in this
article refers to the distribution of assets, typically from an eligible retirement plan to a tax-exempt IRA (i.e., an IRA where the
distributions are not taxed until actual distribution). In contrast, a
Roth IRA is a type of nondeductible IRA, described in I.R.C.
§408A, where an employee’s contributions are not deductible
when contributed. The advantage of a Roth IRA is that the later
withdrawal of contributions and related earnings/investments escape taxation, provided the distribution rules applicable to Roth
IRAs are met.
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plan. While it may be tempting to an employee to roll
assets into an IRA, many retirement investors do not
realize that the fiduciary rules under Title II for IRAs
are not as protective as the fiduciary rules under Title
I for employer-provided plans.12 In addition, transferring pension assets to an IRA causes the employee to
lose the lifetime income protections, the surviving
spouse protections, and the anti-alienation protections
under Title I, that do not exist under Title II.13
Given that some of the rules of both Title I and II
of ERISA were identical, the Congressional Reorganization Plan of 1976 assigned jurisdiction to either
the DOL or the Treasury (via the IRS) based on the
topic at issue.14 The DOL has been given jurisdiction
in interpreting the fiduciary and prohibited transactions rules. Both Titles of ERISA define who is a plan
fiduciary with respect to plan assets,15 as well as prohibiting certain transactions between plan fiduciaries
and plan assets that could result in a conflict of interest (known as the prohibited transaction rules).16
However, the fiduciary rules under Title I and II of
ERISA are not identical, further complicating how the
DOL interprets each of them. Under Title I, a fiduciary is also subject to certain standards of care, including the requirement to act solely in the interests
of the plan participants and beneficiaries and for the
exclusive purposes of providing benefits to such participants and beneficiaries (i.e., the duty of loyalty), as
well as to act with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence that a prudent man would act in similar circumstances (i.e., the duty of prudence).17 If the fiduciary
fails to discharge his duties, he/she is subject to a federal cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, ren12

IRAs are exempt from the fiduciary standards of Part 4 of
ERISA, ERISA §401(a), but are subject to the Internal Revenue
Code’s prohibited transaction rules, set forth in I.R.C. §4975.
13
IRAs are exempt from the life annuity and joint and survivor
annuity rules, and the anti-alienation rules of Part 2 of ERISA,
§3(23), ERISA §205, ERISA §206(d).
14
ERISA Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, Executive Order
No. 12, 108, 44 Fed. Reg. 47,713, 92 Stat. 3790 (Dec. 28, 1978),
‘‘[T]he authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to issue interpretations regarding section 4975 of the Code, subject to certain
exceptions . . . has been transferred to the Secretary of Labor and
the Secretary of the Treasury is bound by such interpretations.’’
The IRS has jurisdiction in determining whether IRAs and other
covered plans are subject to the Code’s prohibited transaction
rules. The DOL has jurisdiction in its determination as to whether
other plans are subject to ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules and
the issuance of exemptions to such rules. However, a DOL’s determination that a prohibited transaction has not occurred does not
prevent the IRS from finding liability under I.R.C. §4975. See
O’Malley v. Commissioner, 972 F.2d 150, 154 (7th Cir. 1992);
Thoburn v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 132, 140 (1990).
15
ERISA §3(21)(A)–§3(21)(B); I.R.C. §4975(e)(3)(A)–
§4975(e)(3)(C).
16
ERISA §406(a); I.R.C. §4975(c)(1).
17
ERISA §404(a)(1)(A)–§404(a)(1)(D).
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dering him/her personally liable to make good any
losses to the plan and to restore to the plan any profits made through the use of such assets.18 These fiduciary standards of care and federal cause of actions
are not set forth under the Title II’s fiduciary rules.
Thus, in the context of an IRA, a fiduciary is not subject to explicit standards of care of loyalty and prudence, nor is he/she subject to an ERISA cause of action for breaches of such standards of care.
Likewise, Title I’s and Title II’s prohibited transaction rules are similar but not identical. The goal of the
prohibited transaction rules is to set forth the presumption that a fiduciary is to have no other motive
in its activities involving the plan or IRA other than
serving it. Thus, they prohibit certain transactions between the plan and a ‘‘party-in-interest’’ (or ‘‘disqualified person’’ which is the term used in the Code), so
as to avoid or minimize any conflicts of interest.19
ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules impose strict liability if applicable and require an exemption (statutorily or administratively through the DOL) for the fiduciary to act. This is in stark contrast with federal securities rules where fiduciary duties may be waived.
This may be of concern to investment advisers who
thought themselves subject only to federal securities
law, and not the mandates of ERISA which are much
different. In addition, if an IRA fiduciary triggers a
prohibited transaction, it ceases to be an IRA exempt
from taxation, and does so retroactively as of the first
day of the tax year in which the prohibited transaction
occurred.20 Thus, the consequences for engaging in a
prohibited transaction are severe for an IRA as it loses
its tax qualified status. Under Title II of ERISA, the
tax provisions which establish prohibited transaction
rules are also enforced through an excise tax on disqualified persons, which includes fiduciaries.21

B. Who Is a Fiduciary With Respect to
Rendering Investment Advice for a
Fee?
Both Title I and II of ERISA have almost identical
definitions as to who is a fiduciary with respect to a
covered plan. To the extent a person or investment advisory firm exercises discretionary investment advice
to an ERISA covered retirement plan or an IRA (e.g.,
he/she determines what investments should be chosen
18

ERISA §502(a)(2), ERISA §409.
ERISA §408(a), §408(b); I.R.C. §4975(c)(1)(A)–
§4975(c)(1)(F).
20
I.R.C. §408(e)(2), §408(e)(3). Other parties to the prohibited
transaction may be subject to a 15% excise tax on the amount involved, plus the potential 100% excise tax if the transaction is not
timely corrected. I.R.C. §4975(a), §4975(b).
21
I.R.C. §4975(a)–§4975(b).
19
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by the plan or IRA), he/she is definitely a fiduciary
under Title I and II of ERISA and, thereby subject to
the respective prohibited transaction rules.22 However, what if an individual or firm does not have discretionary authority over the investment of plan assets, but nevertheless renders investment advice to the
plan or the IRA in exchange for a fee, he/she may be
a fiduciary subject to ERISA’s fiduciary and prohibited transaction rules, as both ERISA §3(21) and
I.R.C. §4975(e)(3) define a fiduciary to include someone who ‘‘renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation.’’23 However, Title II of ERISA goes
beyond Title I and states that an investment advice fiduciary is one who renders investment advice for a
fee or other compensation, but who is also a registered investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; a bank or similar financial institution;
an insurance company; a broker-dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; an affiliate
of a person describe above; or an employee, agent, or
registered representative of an entity described
above.24 Thus, even if the plan or IRA owner can ignore the investment advice of the person or firm, such
investment adviser may nevertheless become a fiduciary under ERISA. Once an individual is found to be
an ERISA fiduciary, he/she also becomes subject to its
respective prohibited transaction rules.25

C. DOL’s 1975 Regulations Regarding
an Investment Advice Fiduciary
The DOL’s original regulations, issued in 1975, set
forth a five-part test as to who is a nondiscretionary
investment adviser to the plan or IRA.26 To the extent
an individual or firm satisfies this five-part test and receives compensation in exchange for its investment
advice, he/she may need a PTE in order to be able to
receive various types of compensation. When ERISA
was passed in 1974, the primary retirement model
used by employers was the defined benefit pension
plan, whereby an employee was promised a lifetime
(or joint and survivor lifetime, if married) annuity of
a specified amount beginning at a normal retirement
age. Under this model, the employer undertook the investment and mortality risks, not the employee. Thus,
most employers employed professional investment
advisers to manage and invest plan assets. By the
22

ERISA §3(21)(A); I.R.C. §4975(e)(3)(A).
ERISA §3(21)(A)(ii); I.R.C. §4975(e)(3)(B).
24
I.R.C. §4975(f)(8)(J)(i)(I)–§4975(f)(8)(J)(i)(VI).
25
ERISA
§406(a)–§406(b);
I.R.C.
§4975(c)(a)(A)–
§4975(c)(a)(F).
26
DOL Reg. §2510.3-21(c)(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 50,842 (Oct. 31,
1975) and Treas. Reg. §54.4975-9(c), 40 Fed. Reg. 50,840 (Oct.
31, 1975).
23

1990s, defined contribution plans, particularly 401(k)
plans, became the predominant retirement model used
by employers.27 Given that ERISA §404(c) absolves
the plan fiduciary from liability for investment losses
if the employer effectively shifts investment control
over to the participant or beneficiary, most 401(k)
plans took advantage of this and allowed plan participants and beneficiaries to select their investments under the employer’s retirement plan.
Quoting from the 1975 regulations, DOL Reg.
§2510.3-21(c)(1) states that:
A person shall be deemed to be rending ‘investment
advice’ to an employee benefit plan . . . only if:
(i) ‘‘Such person renders advice to the plan as to
the value of securities or other property, or makes
recommendations as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other
property; and
(ii) ‘‘Such person either directly or indirectly
(e.g., through or together with any affiliate)
(A) Has discretionary authority or control . . .
with respect to purchasing or selling securities
or other property for the plan; or
(B) Renders any advice described in paragraph
(c)(1)(i) of this section (e.g., investment advice) on a regular basis to the plan pursuant to
a mutual agreement, . . . written or otherwise,
between such person and the plan or a fiduciary with respect to the plan, that such services will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and
that such person will render individualized investment advice to the plan based on the particular needs of the plan regarding such matters as, among other things, investment policies or strategy, overall portfolio composition,
or diversification of plan assets.
Thus, under the original regulations, a fiduciary investment adviser was deemed to be a fiduciary if:
• He/she rendered advice as to the value of the
property or securities or made a recommendation as to the advisability of investing, purchasing, or selling such securities or other property;

• On a regular basis;
• Pursuant to a mutual

understanding with the
plan or the plan fiduciary;

• That served as a primary basis for the investment decision with respect to plan assets; and

27
See Samuel Estreicher and Laurence Gold, The Shift from
Defined Benefit Plans to Defined Contribution Plans, 11 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 331 (2007).
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Where such advice was individualized based on
• the
needs of the plan.
By applying this narrow interpretation of a nondiscretionary fiduciary investment adviser, the DOL limited the number of advisers that would be covered under the test, and thus restricting the number of advisers who would have to assess higher fees because of
their fiduciary status. This five-part test excluded
many financial advisers, including broker-dealers and
their related financial institutions. To the extent an individual or investment firm satisfy all part of the fivepart test and received compensation for such advice,
he/she may need a PTE in order to be able to receive
such compensation. A year later, the DOL further narrowed the fiduciary status definition, in the Deseret
Letter, by stating that a recommendation from a financial adviser to take a distribution of employerprovided funds from a qualified plan and roll such
funds into an IRA was not regarded as investment advice, even though such decision could result in alternative investment choices under the IRA.28 Thus, an
investment professional making such a recommendation did not become a fiduciary by virtue of rendering
investment advice for a fee.
In the federal securities law context, a recommendation to roll monies from a 401(k) plan into an IRA
was viewed as a securities recommendation, subjecting broker-dealers to the suitability standard of care
that prompted certain disclosure requirements.29 Securities laws permitted conflicts of interest between
the adviser or broker dealer and the customer, provided there was adequate disclosure of such conflicts.
In 2010, Congress directed the SEC to ascertain
whether a uniform fiduciary standard should be utilized to broker-dealers and registered investment advisors s when offering personalized advice.30 In contrast, Title I of ERISA’s fiduciary standards require a
fiduciary to act solely in the interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries.31 As such, disclosure of
any potential conflicts of interest is insufficient to absolve liability.
28
DOL Adv. Op. 76-65A (June 7, 1976). The DOL later affirmed this position in DOL Adv. Op. 2005-23A (May 11, 2005),
whereby a recommendation to a plan participant to take a distribution from the plan for purposes of completing a rollover is not
‘‘investment advice’’ nor a recommendation concerning a particular investment (i.e., purchasing or selling securities or other property) under the 1975 regulations. Any investment recommendation
regarding how the proceeds should be invested would be advice
with respect to funds that are no longer assets of the plan.
29
See In the Matters of Richard N. Cea, et al., Exchange Act
Release No. 8662 at 18 (Aug. 6, 1969) (Release 8662); In the
Matter of Mac Robbins; & Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
6846 (July 11, 1962).
30
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §913 of Title IX, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010).
31
ERISA §404(a)(1)(A).
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D. Prohibited Transaction Rules of
Title I and II of ERISA
The prohibited transaction rules of Title I and II of
ERISA are similar but not identical. Title I sets forth
two sets of prohibited transactions in ERISA §406(a)
and ERISA §406(b), whereas Title II’s set of prohibited transaction rules are contained within a single set
in I.R.C. §4975(c). ERISA §406(a) states, that except
as otherwise provided in ERISA §408 (the statutory
exemptions), a fiduciary may not cause the plan to engage in a direct or indirect transaction involving: a
sale or exchange of property between the plan and a
party-in-interest; the lending of money or extension of
credit between the plan and a party-in-interest; furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a plan
and a party-in-interest; or the transfer to, or use by, a
party-in-interest, of any assets or income of the plan.
These are referred to as ‘‘per se’’ prohibited transactions. In contrast, ERISA §406(b) is not caveated with
the phrase ‘‘except as provided in section 408’’ (indicating that the statutory exemption should not be applicable) and thus prohibit the fiduciary from dealing
with plan assets for his own interest or for his own
account (i.e., the self-dealing prohibition); from acting
in a transaction involving the plan whose interest are
adverse to the interest or the plan or its participants or
beneficiary (i.e., the conflict of interest prohibition);
and from receiving any consideration for the fiduciary’s own personal account from any party dealing
with the plan in connection with the transaction involving plan assets (i.e., the kickback prohibition).32
These are referred to as the ‘‘fiduciary prohibited
transactions,’’ as they benefit the fiduciary and do not
necessarily involve a party-in-interest, unless he/she is
also a fiduciary.
In contrast, I.R.C. §4975(c) sets forth a single set
of prohibited transaction rules (which presumably are
all exempt under the statutory exemptions of I.R.C.
§4975(d)), which include the same four ‘‘per se’’ prohibited transactions set forth under Title I and the first
and the third ‘‘fiduciary prohibited transactions’’ set
forth under Title I. Title I’s second fiduciary prohibited transaction involving conflicts of interest is not
contained in Title II’s prohibited transaction rules, as
Title II does not impose a fiduciary standard of care
to act in the best interest of the plan participants or
beneficiaries (i.e., the duty of loyalty).33 However, the
IRS in its regulations has read the two fiduciary pro32

ERISA §406(b)(1)–§406(b)(3).
The legislative history indicates that the second fiduciary
prohibited transaction rule was omitted under title due to the difficulty in determining the ‘‘appropriate measure’’ for an excise
tax. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, 4576 (1974) (Conf. Rep), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038 (stating ‘‘[T]he labor provisions (but not the tax provisions) prohibit a fiduciary from acting
33
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hibited transactions in Title II to include a fiduciary’s
conflict of interest involving the income or assets of
the plan.34 In addition, where the statute under Title II
appears to allow fiduciary prohibited transactions to
be exempt under the statutory exemptions, the IRS
takes the contrary position — namely, that the statutory exemptions of I.R.C. §4975(d) do not contain any
exemptions for fiduciary prohibited transactions, as
the latter involve separate transactions that are not described in any of the statutory exemptions.35 Similar
to Title I, Title II allows the DOL to establish administrative exemptions to the prohibited transaction
rules.
The prohibited transaction rules of Title I and II of
ERISA on their face would appear to deny the ability
of a plan or IRA to engage in services that it would
need in the course of its usual business. For example,
they prohibit a fiduciary from rendering services between a plan and a party-in-interest (e.g., serviceprovider to the plan).36 In order to render such services, the fiduciary and the party-in-interest would
have to comply with one of the statutory exemptions
or an administrative class exemption created by the
DOL.37 As expected, both Title I and II’s statutory exemptions permit the fiduciary to contract with a partyin-interest (or a disqualified person in the context of
the Code) for services necessary for the operation of
the plan (including investment services), provided no
more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor,38
and for the party-in-interest to receive reasonable
compensation for services rendered . . . in the perforin any transaction involved the plan on behalf of a person (or representing a party) whose interests are adverse to the interest of the
plan or of its participants or beneficiaries. This prevents a fiduciary from being put in a position where he has duel loyalties, and,
therefore, he cannot act exclusively for the benefit of a plan’s participants and beneficiaries. (This prohibition is not included in the
tax provisions, because of the difficulty in determining an appropriate measure for an excise tax.’’)).
34
Treas. Reg. §54.4975-6(a)(5)(i) (‘‘The prohibitions of sections 4975(c)(1)(E) and (F) supplement the other provisions . . .
by imposing on disqualified persons who are fiduciaries a duty of
undivided loyalty to the plans for which they act. These prohibitions are imposed upon fiduciaries to deter them from exercising
the authority, control, or responsibility which makes such persons
fiduciaries when they have interests which may conflict with the
interests of the plans for which they act’’).
35
Treas. Reg. §54.4975-6(a) (stating that the statutory exemption for office space or services does not contain an exemption for
acts described in I.R.C. §4975(c)(1)(E) or I.R.C. §4975(c)(1)(F)
as such acts are separate transactions not described in the statutory exemption).
36
ERISA 406(a)(1)(C) and I.R.C. §4975(c)(1)(C), but the Code
uses the term ‘‘disqualified person’’ to identify the person/entity
who is providing services to the plan.
37
ERISA §408(a)–§408(b).
38
ERISA §408(b)(2); I.R.C. §4975(d)(2).

mance of his duties with the plan.39 Both the DOL
and the IRS agree that the first of the two statutory
exemptions permitting a fiduciary to contract with a
party-in-interest (or disqualified person) for purposes
of rendering services if no more than reasonable compensation is paid does not extend to permit selfdealing by the fiduciary.40 Thus, self-dealing by a fiduciary would require a DOL class or individual administrative exemption.
The DOL has interpreted the self-dealing fiduciary
prohibited transaction rule to apply in situations
where the plan fiduciary uses its authority or control
to increase its own compensation in a transaction involving plan assets.41 This would apply in the situation where the fiduciary recommends use of investment products (e.g., propriety products) offered by it
or its affiliates which resulted in indirect fees (e.g.,
finder fees, commissions) back to the fiduciary. The
Frost Bank Opinion by the DOL allowed the fiduciary
to avoid committing a fiduciary prohibited transaction
by offsetting fees that it would have otherwise received from the plan or the plan sponsor.42 The opinion allowed the plan fiduciary to obtain 12b-1 fees
and other administrative service fees (e.g., recordkeeping fees) from the mutual funds that it was recommending as plan investments provided they offset
any fees that the plan owed the plan fiduciary. Thus,
such indirect compensation was not considered to be
additional compensation to the fiduciary which would
have resulted in self-dealing.
Compensation practices whereby a fiduciary adviser is paid a fixed percentage of assets (i.e., level
fees) regardless of the investments actually selected
do not need a class exemption from the prohibited
transaction rules, as there is no self-dealing. However,
when the fiduciary adviser wishes to receive variable
fees (e.g., commissions, 12b-1 fees, and revenue sharing payments) that do vary depending on the investment products selected, such arrangements will need
a class exemption due to the significant conflict of interest posed.
Other relevant prohibited transaction exemptions
that the DOL has issued over the years include PTEs
39

ERISA §408(c)(2); I.R.C. §4975(d)(10).
DOL Reg.§2550.408b-2(a) (stating that ERISA §408(b)(2)
‘‘exempts from the prohibitions of section 406(a) of the Act . . .’’
but ‘‘does not contain an exemption from acts described in section 406(b)(1) . . ., section 406(b)(2) or section 406(b)(3)’’) and
Treas. Reg. §54.4975-6(a) (stating that the statutory exemption for
office space or services does not contain an exemption for acts described in I.R.C. §4975(c)(1)(E) or I.R.C. §4975(c)(1)(F) as such
acts are separate transactions not described in the statutory exemption).
41
DOL Adv. Op. 97-15A (May 22, 1997) and DOL Adv. Op.
2005-10A (May 11, 2005).
42
DOL Adv. Op. 97-15A.
40
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75-1, 84-24, and 86-128. PTE 75-1 extends relief to
non-fiduciary broker-dealers who execute buy-sell
agreements with the plan as agents for securities
transactions and receive a commission.43 Since the
broker-dealer would be a party-in-interest in providing services to the plan in exchange for fees, a class
exemption was needed. It would later be replaced by
PTE 86-128 which allowed a plan fiduciary to receive
fees (e.g., 12b-1 fees, commissions) for effecting and
executing securities transaction as an agent for a plan
or IRA.44 Bank trustees utilizing their in-house brokers relied on this exemption, but it did mandate that
the additional compensation not be excessive and that
specific disclosures were to be made. Broker-dealers
and their affiliates generally did not make use of this
exemption due to the disclosure requirements. PTE
84-24 granted a class exemption relief for agents and
brokers who sold insurance products to plans and received fees in the form of commissions.45

III. BEGINNING IN 2010, REGULATORS
RETHINK STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
APPLICABLE TO INVESTMENT
ADVISERS
A. Exponential Growth of the IRA
Marketplace
The exponential growth of the IRA rollover market
in the early 1990s caused a number of government
and regulatory agencies — the DOL, the SEC,
FINRA, the GAO, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) — to reexamine the applicable
standard of care applicable when a financial adviser,
particularly broker-dealers and registered investment
advisors, recommend that 401(k) plan assets be rolled
into an IRA.46 The phrase ‘‘capture the rollover’’ refers to the ability to have some or all of monies held
43

Securities Transactions Involving Broker-Dealers, Reporting
Dealers, and Banks, PTE 75-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 50,845 (Oct. 31,
1975).
44
Class Exemption for Securities Transactions Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-Dealers, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,181
(Apr. 8, 2016).
45
Class Exemption for Certain Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultant, Insurance Companies, Investment Companies, and Investment Company Principal
Underwriters, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,208 (Apr. 3, 1984), amended at 71
Fed. Reg. 5887 (Feb. 3, 2006).
46
See GAO-13-30, 401(k) plans: Labor and IRS Could Improve the Rollover Process for Participants (Mar. 2013). By 2012,
IRA assets totaled $5.1 trillion, accounting for 28% of U.S. retirement assets, according to the Investment Company Institute (ICI),
The U.S. Retirement Market, Second Quarter 2012 (Sept. 2012).
This GAO report followed a 2011 report entitled GAO-11-119
(Jan. 2011). Responding to the 2013 GAO report, Assistant Sec-
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in a 401(k) employer-provided plan to be rolled over
into an IRA.47
Due to the expansion of the IRA marketplace, the
DOL noticed that brokerage firms were now offering
comprehensive guidance services, as opposed to mere
transactional support, and that their sources of compensation — such as brokerage commissions, revenue
share by mutual funds and funds’ assets managers,
and mark-ups on bonds sold from their own inventory
— produced acute conflicts of interest. For the DOL
to control the types of compensation that an investment adviser to an employee benefit plan or IRA
could receive, the DOL first had to find such adviser
to be an investment advice fiduciary under Title I and
II of ERISA, such that it could then subject such adviser to the fiduciary PTEs. Thus, it needed to rethink
its 1975 regulations as to who is an investment advice
fiduciary and then to craft PTEs such that the fiduciary could receive variable forms of compensation.
By 2010, the DOL became vocal that it was troubled
with three parts of its five-part definition of who is an
investment advice fiduciary receiving a fee — namely,
the requirement that the advice be provided on a regular basis; through a mutual understanding between
the parties; that serviced as a primary basis for the investment decision. It was also alarmed that such investment advisers ‘‘may operate with conflicts of interests that they need not disclose to plan fiduciaries .
. . . [a]nd have limited liability under ERISA for the
advice they provide.’’48 Without any advance public
groundwork, the DOL issued proposed regulations
(referred to by practitioners as Proposal 1.0), altering
who could be a fiduciary investment adviser and applying such definition to the PTE rules applicable to
employee benefit plans and IRAs.49 The proposal
would have rendered a financial adviser to be a fiduciary if he/she (1) rendered ‘‘covered advice’’ (covering three categories of advice) (2) involving one of
four different ‘‘covered relationships’’ and (3) received a fee for such advice (defining the term fee expansively).50 The proposal made investment advisers
registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
as amended, automatic plan fiduciaries, as well as
broker-dealers if their investment advice ‘‘may be
considered’’ for plan investment purposes and was inretary of Labor Phyllis Borzi stated, ‘‘[w]e believe our work regarding the definition of fiduciary is key to addressing conflicted
investment advice and related problems your report identifies.’’
47
See Fred Reish, Bruce Ashton, Joan Neri, and Joshua Waldbeser, Capturing Plan Rollovers, Plan Consultant (Spring 2014).
48
Preamble to DOL Prop. Reg. §2510.3-21(c), 75 Fed. Reg.
65,263, 65,265 (Oct. 22, 2010).
49
DOL Prop. Reg. §2510.3-21(c), 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263.
50
DOL Prop. Reg. §2510.3-21(c)(1)(i)(A).
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dividualized for the plan or the participant.51 That
proposal generated much debate within the investment community, particularly recommending that the
DOL wait for SEC regulatory guidance. As a result,
the DOL withdrew the proposal in 2011, in hopes of
reproposing it in 2012.
A 2013 GAO report was quite critical as it investigated the number of 401(k) participants deciding to
take IRA rollovers in lieu of other distribution options
offered under the employer’s plan.52 In December of
2013, FINRA issued a regulatory notice, reminding
broker-dealers that they were subject to a suitability
standard when recommending a rollover from an employer retirement plan to an IRA and directing them
to critique their marketing communications in promoting such IRA rollovers.53 By 2014, the SEC had
placed on its examination priority list the sales practices of investment advisers promoting 401(k) participants to roll distributions into an IRA, as well as the
marketing and advertising promotions used by brokerdealers and investment advisers to solicit such IRA
rollovers.54 Such activity demonstrated that a number
of regulators were becoming concerned with the IRA
rollover market.

B. DOL’s 2015 Proposal and 2016
Final Fiduciary Rules
By early spring of 2015, President Obama announced in a speech to AARP that he would direct the
DOL to repropose the definition of an investment adviser fiduciary.55 Under the 2015 proposal, the DOL
defined an investment adviser fiduciary as an individual who (1) provided ‘‘covered advice’’ (covering
four categories of advice) (2) for a fee (direct or indirect) to a plan, a plan fiduciary, a participant/
beneficiary, an IRA or an IRA holder in (3) two circumstances, either (a) it acknowledges to be a fiduciary or (b) it provides advice under an agreement
(not necessarily mutual) where the advice is individual to or specifically directed to the recipient for
consideration (even if it is not the primary basis) in
making investment or management decisions with respect to securities or other property (referred to by
practitioners as Proposal 2.0).56 The proposed expansive definition of a fiduciary targeted individuals giv51

DOL Prop. Reg. §2510.3-21(c)(1)(ii)(D).
See Note 45, above.
53
FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45, Rollovers to Individual Retirement Accounts (Dec. 2013).
54
See Examination Priorities for 2014, SEC Office Of Compliance Inspection and Examination (Jan. 9, 2014).
55
See Mark Schoeff Jr., Obama directs Labor Department to
move ahead on fiduciary rule, Investment News (Mar. 4, 2015).
56
DOL Prop. Reg. §2510.3-21, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,928 (Apr. 30,
52

ing occasional or transactional investment advice, unlike the 1975 regulations, as well as those making recommendations as to whether to take a distribution and
invest the monies outside of the plan. Hence, the DOL
proposed revoking the Deseret Letter.
With the proposed regulations, the DOL issued two
new prohibited transaction class exemptions, including the Best Interest Contract (BIC) Exemption,57 as
well as amending existing prohibited transaction class
exemptions.58 In order for financial advisers to continue to receive fees under their current compensation
schemes (e.g., brokerage and insurance commissions,
12b-1 fees, and revenue sharing), the BIC Exemption
required the adviser to acknowledge its fiduciary status; to adhere to standards of impartial conduct; to
warrant that there existed policies and procedures reasonably designed to mitigate any conflicts of interest;
and to disclose its conflicts and the cost of advice.59
Thus, the DOL attempted to impose ERISA’s Title I
duties of prudence and loyalty on an investment adviser to an IRA, as well as creating a private cause of
action enforceable under state court, which was unavailable to IRAs as they are not subject to Title I of
ERISA.60 These elements of the proposal were the
most controversial aspects of the exemption, according to the financial community.
In response to the DOL’s proposal, the Security Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)
issued in early June of 2015 a proposed standard for
financial broker-dealers that set forth a uniform best
interest customer standard to be used when providing
personalized advice about securities to retain investors.61 It criticized the DOL’s proposal as being ‘‘ex2015). For a more in-depth discussion of the DOL proposals, see
Kathryn J. Kennedy, The DOL Proposed Fiduciary Regulations
and Related Prohibited Transaction Exemptions, NYU Rev. of
Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation, CH 3 (2015).
57
Proposed Best Interest Contract Exemption, 80 Fed. Reg.
21,960 (Apr. 20, 2015), and Proposed Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Debt Securities, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,989 (Apr.
20, 2015).
58
Proposed Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption
(PTE) 75-1, Part V., etc., 80 Fed. Reg. 22,004 (Apr. 20, 2015);
Proposed amendment to and Proposed Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84-24, 80 Fed. Reg. 22,010
(Apr. 20, 2015); Proposed Amendment and Proposed Revocation
of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 86-128, 80 Fed. Reg.
22,012 (Apr. 20, 2015); and Proposed Amendments to Class Exemption 7-1, 77-4, 80-83, and 83-1, 80 Fed. Reg. 22,035 (Apr. 20,
2015).
59
See Note 57, above at Section II.
60
Id.
61
Proposed Best Interest of the Customer Standard for BrokerDealers, SIFMA (June 3, 2015).
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tremely burdensome and perhaps ultimately in practice inconsistent with the best interest of the client.’’62
By 2016, the DOL finalized its 2015 proposals by
issuing (1) final regulations under ERISA §3(21) and
I.R.C. §4975(e)(3) as to who was an investment advice fiduciary,63 as well as two prohibited transaction
class exemptions, including the BIC Exemption and
the Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in
Certain Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit plans,64 and (2) amendments to existing prohibited transaction class exemptions.65 The final regulations (referred to as 2016 Fiduciary Rule) replaced the five-part test with a much
broader test such that an individual who (1) provided
‘‘covered advice’’ (which included a recommendation
to take a distribution of benefits from a plan and roll
such amounts into an IRA) for a fee to a plan, participant or beneficiary, an IRA, or an IRA owner and (2)
either acknowledged himself/herself to be a fiduciary
or provided advice pursuant to an agreement based on
the particular investment needs of the recipient or directed advice to the recipient regarding the advisability of a particular investment or management decisions regarding securities.66
The DOL finalized the BIC Exemption for use by
broker-dealers and insurance agents rendering nondiscretionary investment advice to retirement investors
in exchange for fees that varied depending on the investment options selected.67 That exemption required:
(1) that there be a written contract between the adviser
62
See SIFMA President and CEO Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr. Remarks as Prepared for the SIFMA DOL Fiduciary Seminar: Assessing the Intended and Unintended Consequences (June 3,
2015).
63
DOL Reg. §2510.3-21, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016).
For a more in-depth discussion of the DOL proposals, see Kathryn J. Kennedy, The DOL Fiduciary Regulations and Related Prohibited Transaction Exemptions, NYU Rev. of Employee Benefits
and Executive Compensation, CH. 3 (2016).
64
Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002 (Apr.
8, 2016); Class Exemption for Principal Transaction in Certain
Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee
Benefit Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,089 (Apr. 8, 2016).
65
Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE)
75-1, Part V, etc., 81 Fed Reg. 21,139 (Apr. 8, 2016); Amendment
to and Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption
(PTE) 84-24, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,147 (Apr. 8, 2016); Amendment and
Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 86-128,
81 Fed. Reg. 21,181 (Apr. 8, 2016); and amendments to Class Exemption 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, and 83-1, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,208 (Apr.
8, 2016). The financial community estimated that the stricter fiduciary standards in Proposal 2.0 would cost an estimated $2.4 billion and $5.7 billion over 10 years by eliminating conflicts of interest like front-end load commissions and mutual fund 12b-1
fees. See Katelyn Peters, Everything You Need to Know About the
DOL Fiduciary Rule July 14, 2021).
66
DOL Reg. §2510.3-21(a)(2).
67
See Note 65, above.
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and the investor; (2) that the adviser give written acknowledgment that he/she was a fiduciary for purposes of its investment recommendations (3) that the
adviser was required to adhere to ‘‘Impartial Conduct
Standards’’ when rendering investment advice, incorporating ERISA’s loyalty and prudence standards of
care; limiting the adviser to a reasonable amount of
compensation; and requiring the adviser to refrain
from making misleading statements about possible investments; (4) that the adviser would adopt and adhere to policies and procedures, designed to ensure
compliance with the impartial conduct standard; that
the adviser would disclose its material conflicts of interest and adopt measures to avoid or mitigate conflicts of interest that could lead to a breach of the Impartial Conduct Standards; the contract named the
person/title responsible for addressing material conflicts of interest or for monitoring compliance of the
adviser to the Impartial Conduct Standards; and the
contract prohibited the use of quotas, bonuses, etc.
that would lead to recommendations not otherwise in
the best interest of the investor.68 The BIC Exemption
created a cause of action for IRA owners if the exemption was violated.
The DOL’s final regulations and related PTEs, published on April 8, 2016, were to be effective 60 days
after the date of their publication in the Federal Register. President Trump, by Memorandum to the Secretary of Labor dated February 3, 2017, directed the
DOL to examine whether the fiduciary rule would adversely affect the ability of Americans to gain access
to retirement information and financial advice, and to
prepare an updated economic and legal analysis regarding the impact of the fiduciary rule as part of that
examination. On April 7, 2017, the DOL extended the
effective date of the fiduciary rules until April 10,
2017. In the case of the BIC Exemption, the DOL further delayed its effective date until January 1, 2018,
but required fiduciaries relying on the exemption to
adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards during the
transition period from June 9, 2017 until January 1,
2018. On November 29, 2017, the DOL further extended the effective date for the 2016 final regulations
and related PTEs by 18 months, such that the new
transition period would end on July 1, 2019, rather
than on January 1, 2018.69

C. Fifth Circuit’s Vacatur of the 2016
Final Fiduciary Rules
Three business groups (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Council of Life Insurers, and the
68

Id., Section II(d)(1)–(3).
82 Fed. Reg. 56,545, 56,548, 56,550, 56,552 (Nov. 29,
2017).
69
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Indexed Annuity Leadership Council) filed separate
lawsuits in 2016, challenging the DOL’s 2016 Fiduciary Rule (which included its regulations as to who
was an investment advice fiduciary and its related
PTEs). Such lawsuits alleged that the 2016 Fiduciary
Rule was inconsistent with the governing statutes; that
the DOL overreached its authority to regulate services
and providers; that the DOL had imposed legally unauthorized contract terms to enforce its new guidance;
that there were various First Amendment violations;
that the treatment of variable and fixed indexed annuities under the 2016 Fiduciary Rule was arbitrary and
capricious. The three lawsuits were later consolidated,
and the district court in the Northern District of Texas
rejected all of the challenges.70 Upon appeal to the
Fifth Circuit, the court reversed the district court’s
judgment on March 15, 2018, and vacated the DOL’s
2016 Fiduciary Rule.71 As a result, the 2016 Fiduciary
Rule was removed, as well as the BIC Exemption. On
May 7, 2018, the DOL issued Field Assistance Bulletin 2018-02, providing temporary nonenforcement of
prohibited transaction claims against investment advice fiduciaries who worked ‘‘diligently and in good
faith’’ to comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards for transactions that would have been exempt
under the BIC Exemption.72

D. SEC’s 2019 Regulation Best
Interest
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, investment advisers have a fiduciary duty of care in advising clients that requires putting their clients’ best interests before their own; such duty encompasses both
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.73 In contrast,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes a stan70
Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152 (N.D.
Tex. 2017).
71
Chamber of Commerce v. DOL, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018).
72
DOL Field Assistance Bulletin 2018-02 (May 7, 2018).
73
15 U.S.C. §80b-1–§80b-21. The Investment Advisers Act
also requires investment advisers to act in good faith and to disclose all relevant facts relating to the investment to clients; to obtain the best possible price in buying and selling of securities (best
execution); to avoid conflicts of interest and to disclose any potential conflicts of interests to clients; and to establish, maintain,
and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed
to avoid the misuse of material, nonpublic information by the investment adviser. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (SEC v. Capital Gains); see also
footnotes 34–44 in Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,375 U.S.
180, 207 and accompanying text; Investment Adviser Codes of
Ethics, Investment Advisers Act (Advisers Act) Release No. 2256
(July 2, 2004); Compliance Programs of Investment Companies
and Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2204 (Dec. 17, 2003); Electronic Filing by Investment Advisers;
Proposed Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act

dard of conduct for a broker-dealer when making a
recommendation of any securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities such that the
recommendation be ‘‘suitable,’’ when considering the
client’ financial needs, objectives, and circumstances;
such standard does not require that such recommendations be in the client’s best interest.74 The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 directed the SEC (1) to provide a standard of conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers when providing personal investment advice
about securities to retail consumers, and (2) to study
the effectiveness of its existing standards of care for
broker-dealers and investment advisers when offering
personalized advice.75
In response to this congressional request, the SEC
proposed Reg BI in 2018, designed to set forth the
standard of care for broker-dealers who were providing investment advice.76 Such standard obligated the
broker-dealer to act in the best interest of the retail
customer at the time of the recommendation, without
placing the financial or other interest of the brokerdealer (or another entity associated with the brokerdealer) ahead of the interest of the retail customer. By
2019, the SEC adopted a new set of rules ‘‘designed
to enhance the quality and transparency of retail investors’ relationship with investment advisers and
broker-dealers,’’ which included:
• Finalization of Reg BI, with its new standard of
care for broker-dealers when making recommendations to retail customers, including retirement plan rollover recommendations. The
standard was not an explicit loyalty standard
(as found in ERISA), but required the brokerdealer to act in the ‘‘best interest’’ of the retail
customer, without placing the financial or other
interest of the broker-dealer ahead of the interRelease No. 1862 (Apr. 5, 2000). Investment advisers also have
antifraud liability with respect to prospective clients under section
206 of the Advisers Act.
74
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §15(b), 15A, Pub. L. 73291, 15 U.S.C. §78a et seq. See In the Matters of Richard N. Cea,
Exchange Act Release No. 8662 at 18 (Aug. 6, 1969), and In the
Matter of Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
6846 (July 11, 1962). See also FINRA Rule 2111.01 (Suitability)
(‘‘Implicit in all member and associated person relationships with
customers and others is the fundamental responsibility for fair
dealing. Sales Efforts must therefore be undertaken only on a basis that can be judged as being within the ethical standards of
[FINRA’s] Rules, with particular emphasis on the requirement to
deal fairly with the public. The suitability rule is fundamental to
fair dealing and is intended to promote ethical sales practices and
high standards of professional conduct.’’).
75
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §913 of Title IX, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010).
76
See Note 5, above.
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est of the retail customer. It required the
broker-dealer, prior to or at the time of the recommendation, to disclose the scope and terms
of the relationship, including the materials fees
and costs; to note any material limitations on
the securities or strategies that may be recommended (e.g., that the broker-dealer may be
recommending propriety products); and to state
all material facts relating to conflicts of interest
associated with the recommendation.77

•A

new Form CRS Relationship Summary
(Form CRS) was issued to help the retail investor with his/her initial selection and ongoing
decision to maintain an existing relationship
with the adviser. Such form would aid the investor in selecting and maintaining a relationship with a financial professional or firm, by
described the services offered; the fees, costs,
conflicts of interest, and standards of conduct
associated with the services; whether the firm
or its financial professionals have engaged in
legal or disciplinary actions; and how to obtain
more information about the firm. The Form
CRS would be filed with the SEC and furnished to the client.78
Then SEC Chairman Jay Clayton stated that his
agency collaborated with the DOL in setting its investment advice standards in Reg BI.79 The DOL’s
2016 fiduciary standard provided a much higher level
of accountability for broker-dealers than the best interest standard, as it would require the adviser to adhere to Title I’s prudence and loyalty standards.

IV. DOL’S 2020 PROPOSED AND
FINAL REINTERPRETATION OF AN
INVESTMENT ADVICE FIDUCIARY
AND ITS RELATED PROHIBITED
TRANSACTION EXEMPTION (PTE)
(PTE 2020-02)
A. DOL’s 2020 Proposal
In response to the Fifth Circuit’s vacatur, the DOL
on July 7, 2020, did the following:

• It reinstated the 1975 regulation (affirming the
original five-part test as to who is an invest-

ment advice fiduciary) and its Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 regarding participant investment
education;

• It proposed a new prohibited transaction class

exemption available to investment advice fiduciaries entitled ‘‘Improving Investment Advice
for Workers and Retirees;’’ and

• It updated its website to remove the prior BIC

Exemption (PTE 2016-01) and the Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain
Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries
and Employee Benefit plans and IRA (PTE
2016-02) and to return the amended PTEs
(PTEs 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, 83-1, 84-24, and 86128) to their pre-amendment form.80
The DOL did not revoke FAB 2018-02, which provided a temporary nonenforcement policy against prohibited transaction claims against investment advice
fiduciaries who were diligently and in good faith complying with the Impartial Conduct Standards set forth
in the 2016 BIC Exemption.

B. Preamble Which Reinterprets the
1975 Regulations and the Proposed
Exemption
In the Preamble of its proposal, the DOL clarified
elements of the five-part test: (1) it stated that the
analysis in the Deseret Letter was incorrect and thus,
advice regarding a distribution from a plan and rolling it to an IRA or another plan can be considered to
be on ‘‘a regular basis,’’ if the rollover advice is part
of an on-ongoing investment advice or if the rollover
advice is the start of an ongoing relationship;81 (2)
when a financial service professional gives advice in
compliance with the SEC’s Reg BI or another requirement to provide individualized advice, the parties
should reasonably understand that the advice will
serve as a primary basis for the investment decision;82
and (3) any disclaimer of fiduciary would not be conclusive.83 Under the proposed PTE, broad relief was
provided for the receipt of compensation by the investment professional and its financial institution
(e.g., commissions, 12b-1 fees, training commissions,
sales loads, mark-ups and mark-downs, and revenue
sharing payments) from investment providers or third
parties, in connection with investment advice, as well
as allowing financial institutions to engage in princi-

77

Id.
SEC Rule Release No. 34-86032, SEC Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV (final rule), 84 Fed.
Reg. 33,492 (July 19, 2019).
79
Mark Schoeff Jr., DOL proposes new standard to replace vacated fiduciary rule, Investment News (June 29, 2020).
78

12

80
Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees, 85
Fed. Reg. 40,834 (July 7, 2020).
81
Id., 85 Fed. Reg. 40,834, 40,839–40,840.
82
Id., 85 Fed. Reg. 40,834, 40,840.
83
Id., 85 Fed. Reg. 40,834, 40,844.
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pal transactions with plans and IRAs in which the financial institution purchases and sells certain investments from its own account.84 The term financial institution included a registered investment adviser,
bank, insurance company, or registered broker-dealer
that employs an investment professional, or retains
the investment professional as an independent contractor, agent, or registered representative.85
Adherence to the proposed PTE required: (1) Investment advice is to be provided under the Impartial
Conduct Standards which incorporated the ERISA
prudence standard and the requirement that the investment professional or its financial institution or any affiliate not place its financial or other interests ahead of
the retirement investors, as well as the requirements
that the compensation be reasonable; that the financial
institution and the investment professional must seek
to obtain the best execution of the investment transaction; and that no materially misleading statements
were made regarding the recommendation transaction
and other relevant matters;86 (2) Written disclosure be
made prior to the recommended transaction that the
financial institution and its investment professionals
are fiduciaries with respect to any fiduciary investment advice, and written disclosure of their material
conflicts of interest;87 (3) Policies and procedures
must be established and maintained to enforce the Impartial Conduct Standards; they must mitigate conflicts of interest; and the financial institution must
document the rationale for the rollover and account
transfer recommendations;88 (4) The financial institution must engage in an annual review ‘‘reasonably designed’’ to avoid violations of the Impartial Conduct
Standards, that is written and certified by the Chief
Executive Officer or equivalent officer of the financial
institution.89
The proposal did not enlarge the retirement investor’s ability to enforce his/her rights in court, nor did
it create any new legal claims over and above those
authorized by ERISA, which had been principal objections from the financial community.90 By toning
down the requirements of the new exemption as compared to the BIC Exemption, the DOL avoid a confrontation with the financial community.

C. 2020 Final Fiduciary Rule: PTE
2020-02
On December 18, 2020, the DOL finalized its new
exemption and coined it PTE 2020-02, ‘‘Improving
84

Id., 85 Fed. Reg. 40,834, 40,836.
See Note 80, above, Section V(d).
86
Id., Section II(a).
87
Id., Section II(b).
88
Id., Section II(c).
89
Id., Section II(d).
90
Id., 85 Fed. Reg. 40,834, 40,837.
85

Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees,’’ which
set forth the new Best Interest Prohibited Transaction
Exemption.91 PTE 2020-02 permits investment advice
fiduciaries to receive variable compensation (e.g.,
commissions, 12b-1 fees, revenue sharing, and markups and mark-downs in certain principal transactions),
otherwise prohibited under Title I and II of ERISA,
provided the conditions of the exemption are satisfied.
While the new rules were to be effective February
16, 2021, the Preamble to PTE 2020-02 stated that the
DOL would not be pursuing enforcement claims for
breaches of fiduciary duty or prohibited transactions
for the period between 2005 (when the Deseret Letter
was issued) and February 16, 2021.92 On October 25,
2021, the DOL issued FAB 2021-02 which extended
the nonenforcement policy from December 21, 2021
through January 31, 2022, for investment advice fiduciaries who were working diligently, and in good
faith, to comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards.93 Hence, Investment Professionals and their Financial Institutions are wrestling with the new rules
beginning February 1, 2022, as they become subject
to full enforcement. The DOL also extended the nonenforcement policy with respect to the specific docu91

Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees, 85
Fed. Reg. 82,798 (Dec. 18, 2020). The DOL considered whether
to delay the effective date of the exemption, pursuant to the
memorandum from Ronald A. Klain, Assistant to the President
and Chief of Staff, entitled Regulatory Freeze Pending Review,
but decided that the PTE 2020-02 should go into effect as scheduled. Throughout the discussion of Part IV.C. of this article (2020
Final Fiduciary Rule: PTE 2020-02), defined terms such as Financial Institution, Investment Professional, Affiliate, Retirement Investor, and Impartial Conduct Standards will be capitalized, referring to the specific definition used in Section V to define such persons or entities.
92
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,804. The DOL also allowed FAB
2018-02 to remain in effect until December 20, 2021. 85 Fed.
Reg. 82,798, 82,799. See also DOL, New Fiduciary Advice Exemption: PTE 2020-02 Improving Investment Advice for Workers
& Retirees, Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 2021).
93
See DOL, News Release, U.S. Department of Labor Announces Temporary Enforcement Policy on Prohibited Transaction Rules Applicable to Investment Advice Fiduciaries, The DOL
stated that the new transition relief was provided due to the ‘‘practical difficulties for financial institutions that are in the process of
complying with the exemption conditions.’’ In footnote four of
FAB 2021-02, the DOL states that the Treasury and the IRS, on
March 28, 2017, issued IRS Announcement 2017-4, which provides that the IRS will not apply the excise tax provisions of
I.R.C. §4975 and the related reporting requirements with respect
to any transaction to which the DOL’s temporary enforcement
policy described in FAS 2017-02, or other subsequent related enforcement guidance, would apply. The Treasury and the IRS confirmed that for purposes of IRS Announcement 2017-4, FAS
2021-02 constitutes ‘‘other subsequent related enforcement guidance.’’
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mentation and disclosure requirements for rollovers in
PTE 2020-02 through June 30, 2022.94
In the Preamble to the new exemption, the DOL
gave its thoughts as to how it would be reinterpreting
the five-part test as to who is an investment advice fiduciary. The DOL recently put on its regulatory guidance plan its intent to amend the regulatory definition
of the term fiduciary set forth in the regulations.95 It
is questionable whether the courts will give deference
to the DOL’s new interpretation as to who is an investment adviser fiduciary, as its prior interpretation
was in existence for the past 46 years.96
The remainder of this article is to provide an analysis of the new rules and a guide as to common mistakes that may be made in compliance with the new
rules.
1. Preamble Which Reinterprets the 1975
Regulations
In the Preamble to the 2020 Final Fiduciary Rule,
the DOL provided its opinion as to how it now interprets the five-part test under the 1975 regulations. It
focused particularly on what is a recommendation in
the context of investment advice; how is it provided
on a regular basis; and what constitutes a mutual
agreement between the parties.
As to what it regards as a recommendation as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities in the context of a rollover recommendation,
the DOL notes that advice to roll over plan assets into
an IRA will be considered to be fiduciary investment
advice under the five-part definition, even if there is
no recommendation as to how to invest the assets in
the IRA.97 The rationale is that a recommendation to
roll assets out of one plan and into another results in
changes in fees, asset management structures, investment options, and investment service options. Thus,
the Deseret Letter is revoked prospectively.98 The
DOL’s interpretation is prefaced by stating the advice

to roll over plan assets must be part of the ongoing
advice relationship that satisfies the regular basis
prong of the five-part test.99 The DOL rejected that
‘‘regular basis’’ is limited to relationships in which the
advice is provided at fixed intervals; instead, it describes such relationship as one that is ‘‘recurring,
non-sporadic, and expected to continue.’’100 Thus, a
single instance of advice to take a distribution or a
one-time sales transaction in which there is no ongoing investment advice relationship (nor is there an expectation of such an ongoing relationship) will not be
regarded as ‘‘regular.’’101 Likewise, ‘‘sporadic interactions’’ between the adviser and the investor do not
rise to the level required of ‘‘a regular basis.’’102 The
DOL intends to view marketing materials used by advisers in making this determination. The advisers can
make it clear in their communications that there is no
intent to enter into an ongoing relationship to provide
investment advice.103
But any first-time advice to roll assets over to an
IRA that is intended to be the beginning of a longterm relationship (determined at the time of the rollover recommendation) will be deemed to have satisfied ‘‘a regular basis’’ requirement.104 The issue will
then be whether the parties reasonably expected an
ongoing investment advice relationship at the time the
rollover recommendation was made. The DOL confirmed that it does not regard this as a retroactive imposition of fiduciary status. Similarly, where the person making the recommendation to roll assets over
expects to make investment recommendations regarding the IRA as part of an ongoing relationship, such
recommendation will be regarded as being provided
on a regular basis. Here, the DOL does not distinguish
between advice given to the retirement investor in a
Title I plan, and advice given to the same individual
in an IRA, when determining whether there is an ongoing relationship.
Because the term ‘‘rollover’’ is defined broadly under the exemption, it covers the following transfer of
assets:

94

See Note 93, above.
DOL, Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary,’’ RIN 1210-AC02
(Fall 2021).
96
See National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440
U.S. 472 (1979), where the Supreme Court questioned an agency’s interpretation of a statute with skepticism when it had not
been consistent over time.
97
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,803. The DOL states that rollovers
from Title I Plans to IRAs are expected to approach $2.4 trillion
cumulatively from 2016 through 2020, quoting Cerulli Associates,
U.S. Retirement Markets 2019.
98
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,803–82,804. Thus, the Deseret Letter is rescinded prospectively, and the DOL states that it will not
pursue claims for rollover advice that would have been covered
by such letter. 85 Fed. Reg. 82,806. The DOL mentions that advisory opinions, such as the Deseret Letter, are interpretive statements from the agency and thus were not subject to the notice and
comment process. 85 Fed. Reg. 82,804.
95
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99
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,805. ‘‘In circumstances in which the
investment advice provider has been giving advice to the individual about investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other
financial instruments through tax-advantaged retirement vehicles,
. . . the advice to roll assets out of a Title I Plan is part of an ongoing advice relationship. Similarly, advice to roll assets out of a
Title I Plan into an IRA where the investment advice provider has
not previously provided advice but will be regularly giving advice
regarding the IRA in the course of a lengthier financial relationship would be the start of an advice relationship that satisfies the
regular basis prong.’’
100
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,806.
101
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,805.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,805.
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• From a Title I plan to an IRA;
• From a Title I plan to another Title I plan;
• From an IRA to a Title I plan;
• From an IRA to another IRA; and
• From one type of account to another.105

As to whether there is a mutual agreement that the
investment advice will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions, the DOL asserts that it will look
to the facts and circumstances surrounding the recommendation and the relationship to ascertain whether
those facts gave rise to a mutual agreement that the
advice would serve as a primary basis for an investment decision.106 The DOL states that written disclaimers made by advisers that there is no mutual
agreement will not be conclusive, nor will be statements that the adviser is not a fiduciary. Note that if
the adviser is relying on the PTE 2020-02 exemption
in order to receive certain types of compensation for
its investment advice, he/she must in fact disclose his/
her fiduciary status, which will satisfy the mutual understanding prong of the test.
Likewise, the primary basis requirement does not
demand proof that the advice was the sole and most
important determinative factor in the investor’s decision.107 The question is whether the advice served as
‘‘a’’ primary basis. Hence, the use of the phrase a primary basis goes to the materiality of the advice.108
Similarly, the fact that the investor consulted multiple
advisers could lead one to conclude that each outcome
was important and enough to satisfy a primary basis
requirement.109 But all the elements of the five-part
test must be met and if the investor does not act on
the recommendation made by the adviser, the adviser
will not have liability for such recommendation.
The DOL stated that ‘‘Hire Me’’ communications
whereby advisers attempt to engage in introductory
conversations to advocate for their services will not
be treated as fiduciary communications.110 These
types of communications may be relevant when the
retirement investor has already made the decision to
do a rollover of assets and is now requesting assistance with respect to the investment of those assets.
This may be useful for smaller registered investment
105
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,803, n.33, and 82,830. The DOL
does not specify what is meant by a transfer of assets from one
type of account to another but provides an example whereby assets are transferred from a commission-based account to a feebased account.
106
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,805.
107
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,808.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,809.

adviser firms that can supervise and train investment
professionals. They may choose to design educational
brochures that investment professionals can hand to
investors regarding investment choices.
2. Applicable Terms and Conditions of PTE
2020-02
The final prohibited transaction, PTE 2020-02, followed closely its proposal. It retains the proposal’s
wide protective framework, including the Impartial
Conduct Standards; disclosures, including a written
acknowledgment of fiduciary status; policies and procedures prudently designed to ensure compliance with
the Impartial Conduct Standards and that mitigate
conflicts of interest; and a retrospective compliance
review.111 The conditions of the exemption were designed to ensure that financial institutions will assess
all sources of fees and revenue to identify and mitigate conflicts of interest and to receive no more than
reasonable compensation in connection with investment advice transaction.112 The exemption allows
prohibited transactions that otherwise would arise due
to the payment of prohibited compensation in connection with the recommendation of a security or investment product or a rollover recommendation.
PTE 2020-02 is divided into five Sections:
• Section I sets forth what transactions permit
Investment Professionals and Financial Institutions who provide fiduciary investment advice
to Retirement Investors to receive otherwise
prohibited compensation. It also notes that the
exemption excludes certain plans and transactions.

• Section II sets forth the terms that govern those
transactions: the new Impartial Conduct Standards; new disclosure requirements; new policies and procedures to ensure that the Impartial
Conduct Standards are met; a retrospective review by the Financial Institution to detect and
prevent violations of the Impartial Conduct
Standards; and a self-correction mechanism to
be utilized to avoid a violation of the conditions of the exemption.

• Section

III is labeled ‘‘Eligibility,’’ but describes those Investment Professionals and Financial Institutions who may be ineligible to
rely on the exemption due to a criminal conviction under ERISA or due to the DOL’s determination.

111

85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,799.
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,816. Thus, Financial Institutions
and Investment Professionals may receive various sources of compensation such as 12b-1 fees, revenue sharing, sales loads, principal transactions, or propriety products.
112
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• Section

IV requires certain records be maintained for a period of six years.

• Section V sets forth the definitions of specific
terms utilized throughout the exemption.

a. Who Are the Covered Parties Subject to the
Exemption?
In its definitional section of PTE 2020-02, Financial Institutions includes SEC and state registered investment advisers, broker-dealers, insurance companies, and banks, who employ Investment Professionals.113 However, a record-keeper to a plan or IRA that
is not also a bank, broker-dealer, insurance company,
or registered investment adviser would not be covered.114 Investment Professionals are defined to include an individual who is a fiduciary to the plan or
IRA by reason of providing investment advice; who is
an employee, independent contractor, agent, or representative of a Financial Institution; and who satisfies
federal and state regulatory requirements of insurance,
banking, and securities laws with respect to the covered transaction.115 By capturing employees, independent contractors, agents, or representatives of a Financial Institutions, the DOL has taken a very broad approach as to who must rely on the PTE. An Affıliate
of a Financial Institution or an Investment Professional is defined as a person or entity within the control (i.e., power to exercise a controlling influence
over the management or policies) of the Financial Institution or the Investment Professional; any officer,
director, partner, employee or relative of the Financial
Institution or the Investment Professional; or any corporation or partnership of which the Financial Institution or Investment Professional is an officer, director,
or partner.116
Retirement Investors are defined to include (1) a
participant or beneficiary of a plan with authority to
direct the investments of his account assets or to take
a distribution (2) the beneficial owners of an IRA acting on behalf of the IRA or (3) a fiduciary of a plan
or an IRA.117 Unlike prior proposals, the definition of
a plan is not based on the size of the plan assets.
The exemption explicitly excludes: (1) Title I plans
where the Investment Professional, Financial Institu113
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section V — Definitions (e). This definition is based on the entities set forth in the statutory exemption
for investment advice under ERISA §408(b)(14) and I.R.C.
§4975(d)(17).
114
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,814.
115
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section V — Definitions (h).
116
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section V — Definitions (a). In the
Preamble, the DOL notes that foreign affiliates were not excluded
from the definition of an affiliate. 85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,814.
117
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section V — Definitions (k).
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tion, or an Affiliate is the employer of the employees
covered under the plan; (2) transactions involving investment advice generated solely by an interactive
website in which computer software-based models or
applications provide investment advice based on the
personal information supplied by the Retirement Investor; (3) transactions involving the Investment Professional acting in its fiduciary activity other than as
an investment advice fiduciary (e.g., the transaction
relates to discretionary management transactions or
arrangements).118
b. What Are the ‘‘Covered Transactions’’?
To better understand what transactions are covered
by the exemption, the author has provided some background information for those less knowledgeable
about securities laws. When an investor wishes to purchase stock, he/she can work through a Financial Institution and purchase the stock in either a principal
transaction or an agency transaction. A principal
transaction is one in which the Financial Institution
buys and sells the requested securities out of its own
inventory in order to fulfill the investor’s request. In
contrast, an agency transaction is one in which the Financial Institution acts as an agent for the investor. A
broker-dealer generally acts as a ‘‘dealer’’ in a principal transaction and as a ‘‘broker’’ in an agency transaction. For example, the investor asks the broker to
purchase a share of stock and the dealer acts as the
counterparty and sells the stock to the investor out of
its own inventory. In contrast, in an agency transaction, the broker would purchase the stock in the marketplace for his/her account (taking on the role of
principal), in order to offset the transaction with the
investor.
When a broker-dealer acts in a principal transaction, he/she is compensated for executing the transaction by assessing a ‘‘markup’’ or ‘‘markdown’’ on the
market price of the stock being purchased or sold. In
the case of a sale, a markup is the difference between
the price of the stock that the broker paid in the market and the price the dealer receives from the investor.
In the case of a purchasing, the market price of the
stock is increased by an amount that the dealer assessed for the transaction. Due to the adviser’s ability
to receive price spreads from principal transactions,
the DOL is troubled that such transaction could bias
the adviser’s recommendation.
Under PTE 2020-02, the DOL makes a distinction
between a riskless principal transaction and a principal transaction that is not riskless (referred to as a
nonriskless principal transaction). A nonriskless principal transaction is one in which the Investment Professional or Financial Institution is purchase from or
118

85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section I — (c).
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selling to the plan, the participant or beneficiary account, or IRA a security or other investment from the
account of the Financial Institution or its affiliate. Because the Investment Professional or Financial Institution is on both sides of the transaction, there is a
clear and direct conflict of interest. Not only does the
adviser earn the commission on the sale, it may also
earn extra income on the bid-ask spread. In addition,
such transactions typically lack pre-trade price transparency and as such, the investor may not be able to
evaluate the fairness of the transaction.
In contrast, a riskless principal transaction is one in
which the Financial Institution, after receiving an order from the plan or IRA investor to purchase or sell
an asset, executes an identical order in the marketplace, taking on the role of principal to fill the order.
A riskless principal transaction is more akin to an
agency transaction and thus, poses less of an inherent
conflict of interest. FINRA requires such trades be executed at the same price, exclusive of a markup/
markdown, commission, or other fees. For example, a
broker who, upon getting investor A’s order to buy
1,000 shares of ABC at the current price of $10/share,
must buy 1,000 shares of ABC at $10 from another
broker. As both trades were executed at $10/share (excluding commissions), it is a riskless principal transaction.119
Principal transactions that are riskless principal
transactions are covered under the exemption and
thus, permitted if the other conditions are met. However, principal transactions that are non-riskless principal transactions are subject to additional limitations
under the exemption:
• For purchases from a plan or an IRA, the transaction can involve any security or other investment property.120
• For sales to a plan or an IRA, the transaction is
limited to transactions involving: U.S. dollar
denominated corporate debt securities; U.S.
Treasury securities; debt securities issued or
guaranteed by a U.S. federal government
agency other than the U.S. Department of Treasury; debt securities issued or guaranteed by a
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE); municipal securities; certificates of deposit; and
interests in Unit Investment Trusts.121
c. Conditions of the Exemption
For Financial Institutions, Investment Professionals, and their Affiliates to engage in covered transactions as a result of providing investment advice, the
119

85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,816.
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section V — Definitions, (d)(2).
121
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section V — Definitions, (d)(1).
120

following conditions of the exemption must be met in
order to receive variable compensation:
i. The first condition is adherence to the Impartial Conduct Standards. This condition envisions
three parts: First, the investment advice must be
in the ‘‘best interest’’ of the retirement investor
(i.e., a prudence standard) and may not place the
financial interest or other interests of the Financial Institution, Investment Professional, or its
Affiliate ahead of the interest of the Retirement
Investor (i.e., a loyalty standard).122 The loyalty
standard was intended to be on par with the standard set forth in the SEC’s Reg BI and the SEC’s
interpretation regarding the conduct standard for
investment advisers. The new standard deleted
the prior BIC Exemption requirement that the fiduciary to act ‘‘without regard’’ to his/her own
interest, which would have been more consistent
with ERISA Title I’s duty of loyalty (i.e., to act
for the exclusive benefit of the plan participants
and beneficiaries). Second, the exemption sets
forth a reasonable compensation standard, such
that the Financial Institution, Investment Professional, or their Affiliates or related entities are not
to receive compensation in excess of what is
‘‘reasonable compensation,’’ within the meaning
of ERISA §408(b)(2) and I.R.C. §4975(d)(2).
The factors the DOL will consider in determining reasonableness of the compensation include:
the nature of the services provided; the market
price of the services and/or the underlying assets;
the scope of monitoring; and the complexity of
the product.123 For example, when faced with
two investments equally available to the investor,
the adviser is not permitted to advise one over the
other based on the Investment Professional’s or
the Financial Institution’s bottom line.124 This
part also invokes a best execution standard such
that, consistent with federal securities law, the Financial Institution and the Investment Profes122
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section II — Investment Advice Arrangement (a)(1). This prudence standard requires the investment
advice to ‘‘reflect the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstance then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims, based on
the investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances,
and needs of the Retirement Investor.’’
123
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,824. What is reasonable is a facts
and circumstances determination. For example, when faced with
two investments equally available to the investor, the adviser is
not permitted to advise one over the other based on the adviser’s
or the financial institution’s bottom line.
124
See New Fiduciary Advice Exemption: PTE 2020-02, Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees, Frequently
Asked Questions, Q&A 12 (Apr. 2021).
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products, payments from third parties, and
certain compensation arrangements.129 In
the context of a recommendation to roll
monies over to an IRA managed or advised
by the adviser, the conflict of interest resulting in the payment of additional compensation should also be disclosed. The description must be accurate in all material aspects.
The purpose of the disclosure requirements
is to reinforce the exemption’s focus on conflict mitigation and to promote consumer
choice, such that the investor has a clear understanding of the nature of the relationship
between him/her and the adviser.130

sional must seek to obtain the best execution of
the investment transaction reasonably available
under the circumstances.125 Third, the standard
requires that the statements made by the Financial Institutions and its Investment Professionals
made to the Retirement Investor about the recommended transaction and other relevant matters
not be materially misleading at the time they are
made.126
ii. The second condition involves disclosures.
Prior to engaging in any transaction pursuant to
the exemption, the Financial Institution is required to disclose in writing:

• Its acknowledgment that the Financial Insti-

• In the context of a rollover recommendation,

tution and its Investment Professional are fiduciaries under Title I and/or the Code, as
applicable, with respect to the investment
advice being provided to the investor;127 and

there must be a documentation, given prior
to engaging in the rollover, as to the specific
reasons that such rollover is in the best interest of the investor.131 Because the decision
to roll assets over from a Title I plan to an
IRA may be one of the most important financial decision a Retirement Investor makes
due to the impact it has on his/her legal
rights and remedies, the DOL wants the rationale for such decision to be documented
and to serve as a record for later review.132
This will undoubtedly be the most difficult
part of the exemption to comply with, as it
depends on so many variables. Such documentation will also be the most critical document for plaintiff attorneys and the DOL
regulators, when reviewing whether the
terms of the exemption were satisfied. Thus,
there will be five steps needed for compliance in the typical rollover from an employer’s plan to an IRA: (1) information about
the participant’s existing plan investments
(e.g., portfolio of investments offered, costs
and expenses); (2) information about the
plan; in this regard the DOL believes that the
disclosure statement required under ERISA
§404(a)133 would be a good starting point;
(3) information about the IRA to which the

• A description of the services to be provided,

and the material conflicts of interest arising
out of the services and any recommended investment transaction.128

• Examples provided of material conflicts of

interest required to be disclosed include conflicts inherent in recommending proprietary

125

85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section II — Investment Advice Arrangement (a)(2)(A). Such federal securities law include the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as well as rules adopted by
FINRA and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB).
126
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section II — Investment Advice Arrangement (a)(3). In this regard, the DOL provides an example in
which a financial institution’s inclusion of exculpatory language
(clearly prohibited under state law) would be misleading as it
would dissuade a retirement investor from asserting legal rights
otherwise available to him/her. See Preamble, 85 Fed. Reg.
82,826.
127
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section II — Investment Advice Arrangement (b)(1). In this regard, the DOL provides model fiduciary acknowledgment language in the preamble: ‘‘When we provide investment advice to you regarding your retirement plan account or individual retirement account we are fiduciaries within
the meaning of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and/or the Internal Revenue Code, as applicable which are
laws governing retirement accounts. The way we make money
creates some conflicts with your interest, so we operate under a
special rule that requires us to act in your best interest and not put
our interest ahead of yours.’’ The DOL also acknowledges in the
preamble that such fiduciary acknowledgment is not intended to
create a private right of action between a financial institution or
investment professional and the retirement investor. See Preamble,
85 Fed. 82,826–82,828. Also, note that while some fiduciaries
have acknowledged their status as a fiduciary under Title I of
ERISA, they have not done so in the context of being a fiduciary
under Title II of ERISA.
128
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section II — Investment Advice Arrangement (b)(2).
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85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,829.
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,829.
131
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section II — Investment Advice Arrangement (b)(3).
132
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,830.
133
The DOL Reg. §2550.404a-5 set for the plan fiduciary’s disclosure requirements for the allocation of investment responsibilities to participants or beneficiaries: their rights and responsibilities with respect to the investment assets held within their account; fees and expenses assessed against their accounts; and
designated investment alternatives, including fees and expenses,
available for the participant or beneficiary.
130
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disclosure at the time of the recommendation
would be permitted to do so.137
iii. The third condition of the exemption involves policies and procedures. This part of the
exemption requires Financial Institutions to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies
and procedures prudently designed to ensure
compliance with the Impartial Conduct Standards.138 Such policies and procedures ‘‘are required to mitigate conflicts of interest to the extent that a reasonable person reviewing the policies and procedures and incentive practices as a
whole would conclude that they do not create an
incentive for a Financial Institution or Investment
Professional to place their interests ahead of the
interest of the Retirement Investor.’’139 Such
standard requires that incentives must be mitigated to make Financial Institutions identify and
focus on any conflicts of interest in their business
models that could create incentives to place their
interests ahead of the interest of the investor.140
The DOL’s intent with this condition is to force
Financial Institutions to identify and to focus on
any conflicts of interest in their business models
that could create incentives to place their interests ahead of the interests of the investor.141 This
requirement will pose practical problems for Financial Institutions who have relied upon sales
incentives to increase business.
The DOL acknowledges that regulators in the securities and insurance industries have similar requirements as to having policies and procedures
in place for registered investment advisers to
eliminate sales contests and similar incentive
programs.142 In the securities space, the challenge has been to avoid making policies and procedures too detailed such that they can’t be flexible when circumstances changes; to test and enforce their compliance based on current
resources; and to identify who is responsible for
supervising those subject to the policies and procedures.
Inherent in this third condition is to have the Financial Institutions to periodically review the
policies and procedures to ensure they are ac-

funds will be rolling into, particularly if the
IRA involves increased costs, and why the
added benefits justify such costs; (4) in light
of the participant’s needs and circumstances
(e.g., is he/she retiring and entering into a
decumulation stage, as opposed to accumulation stage), the reasons why the IRA rollover is in the best interest of the participant;
and (5) written documentation of the specific
reasons for recommending a rollover.134
Factors that the Financial Institution and Investment Professional may wish to highlight
with a rollover recommendation include:

• Alternatives to a rollover available to the

Retirement Investor, including leaving
money in his/her current employer plan,
rolling assets into an IRA, or transferring
monies into a new employer plan, if available;

• The fees, services, and investment options
available under each option, and whether
the employer currently pays for some or
all of the plan’s administrative expenses;

• The longer-term impact of an increase in
costs due to the compounding of interest;

• The effect of significant features such as

surrender schedules and participation
rates; and

• For rollovers from another IRA or changes
from a commission-based account to a
fee-based arrangement, consideration and
documentation of services to be provided
under the new arrangement.135

The new disclosure requirements are to be
written in plain English and must take into account the Retirement Investor’s level of financial experience. They may be satisfied through
a single disclosure or combination of disclosures, some of which may be required by other
regulators.136 The disclosures are to be provided prior to the transaction, but the DOL
notes that the parties wishing to provide the
137
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135
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,831.
136
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,829. Examples of other regulatory
disclosures that may be used to satisfy this condition include the
SEC’s Form ADV or Form CRS, applicable to registered investment advisers; disclosures required under insurance and banking
laws when such disclosures cover services to be provided and the
Financial Institution’s and Investment Professional’s material conflicts of interest.
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complishing their intended purpose.143 Hence, to
the extent new products, lines of business, or
compensation packages are newly established,
the Financial Institution should consider how to
adjust their policies and procedures accordingly.
iv. The fourth condition mandates a retrospective
review by the Financial Institution. This condition requires the Financial Institution to conduct
an annual retrospective review to detect and prevent violations of the exemption, and to achieve
compliance with the Impartial Conduct Standards
and the policies and procedures.144 As such, the
Financial Institution will be required to monitor
the conduct of their Investment Professionals to
assure compliance with the exemption. The
methodology and results of the retrospective review must appear in a written report provided to
one of the financial institution’s senior executive
officers (e.g., chief executive officers, chief financial officers, president, or any one of the three
most senior officers).145 Such report must be certified by a Senior Executive Officer of the Financial Institution as follows:
• He/she has reviewed the report;
• The Financial Institution has in place policies and procedures prudently designed to
assure compliance with the exemption;
• The Financial Institution has in place a prudent process to modify its policies and procedures as changes and events dictate, and to
evaluate the effectiveness of its policies and
procedures on a regular basis to ensure compliance; and
• The report has been completed no later than
six months following the end of the period
covered by the review, and the report, its certification, and its supporting data must be
maintained for a period of 6 years.146
This annual certification may be too daunting for
small investment firms, forcing them to take the
educational route in advising Retirement Investors.
v. The fifth condition of the exemption involves
self-correction. The DOL has provided a method
143

85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,836.
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section II — Investment Advice Arrangement (d)(1).
145
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section II — Investment Advice Arrangement (d)(2). The retrospective review is based on FINRA
rules applicable to broker-dealers. See 85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, n.131,
82,838.
146
85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, Section II — Investment Advice Arrangement (d)(3)(A)–(C), (d)(4), and (d)(5).

of self-correction under the exemption such that
a non-exempt prohibited transaction will not be
deemed to have occurred if:

• Either the violation resulted in no investment

losses to the Retirement Investor, or the Financial Institution made the Retirement Investor whole for any resulting losses;

• The Financial Institution corrects the violation and notifies the DOL via email within
30 days of correction;

• The correction occurs no later than 90 days

after the Financial Institution learned of the
violation or reasonably should have learned
of the violation; and

• The Financial Institution notifies the persons
responsible for conducting the retrospective
review during the applicable cycle, and the
violation and correction are duly noted in the
written report of the retrospective review.147

vi. The sixth condition of the exemption focuses
on who is eligible to utilize it. While the section
of the exemption is labeled ‘‘Eligibility,’’ it sets
forth those Financial Institutions and Investment
Professionals who are ineligible to invoke the exemption because they, within the previous 10
years, were convicted of certain crimes arising
out of their provision of investment advice to Retirement Investors.148 They may also be ineligible if the DOL notifies them that they have engaged in systematic or intentional violations of
the exemption’s provisions or provided materially misleading information to the DOL in relation to their conduct pursuant to the exemption.149
3. Effective Dates
The DOL announced that FAB 2018-02 would remain in effect until December 20, 2021.150 The effective date of PTE 2020-02 was originally February 16,
2021.151 Due to the difficulties for Financial Institutions to implement the disclosures conditions of the
exemption, the DOL gave two extensions to the effective date in PTE 2020-02:
• January 31, 2022, whereby the DOL and the
IRS would not enforce the conditions of the exemption for Financial Institutions and Invest-

144
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ment Professionals ‘‘who are working diligently and in good faith to comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards for transactions that
are exempted in PTE 2020-02;’’152 and
• June 30, 2022, whereby the nonenforcement
approach would extend to the specific documentation and disclosure requirements set forth
for rollovers in the exemption.153 All other
parts of the exemption become subject to full
enforcement beginning on February 1, 2022.
One may ask if there are any alternatives to complying with PTE 2020-02. To avoid application of the
new rules, the Investment Professional may argue that
he/she has engaged in only ‘‘hire me’’ communications, so as to begin an introductory conversation with
the investor. An adviser may also argue that all five
elements of the DOL regulations have not been met,
and thus he/she is not a fiduciary. However, the DOL
has stated in the Preamble that disclaimers do not negate the adviser being held to be a fiduciary.154 Finally, the Financial Professional may decide to rely on
only information and education, consistent with Interpretive Bulletin 96-1,155 as to investment options
available to the Retirement Investor. Here, the Financial Professional must guard against making any explicit or implied investment recommendations.
4. Enforcement Efforts
For those Investment Professionals and Financial
Institutions who fail to satisfy all the conditions of the
exemption, various sources of liability include:
• Filing of the Form 5330 to the IRS and payment of I.R.C. §4975 imposes an excise tax of
15% on the amount involved for the plan or
IRA (increased to 100% of the amount involved is the prohibited transaction is not
timely corrected);
• ERISA Title I subjects an investment advice fiduciary to claims for breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA §502(a)(2) and equitable relief
(e.g., removal of the fiduciary) under ERISA
§502(a)(3) initiated by the DOL for claims related to plans (as well as possible penalties
equal to 20% of any ‘‘amount recovered’’ by
the DOL pursuant to litigation or a settlement
agreement, under ERISA §502(1)); such liability would not be applicable for IRAs; and
• Breach of fiduciary duty and equitable relief
under ERISA §502(a)(2) and ERISA
152

DOL Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2021-02 (Oct. 25, 2021).
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85 Fed. Reg. 82,798, 82,805.
155
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1; Participant Investment Education, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,586 (June 11, 1996).
153

§502(a)(3) initiated by the plan or participants/
beneficiaries for losses incurred or disgorgement of wrongful profit or undue enrichment.
On April 13, 2021, the DOL released FAQs on PTE
2020-02, which listed 21 questions and answers.156 In
question 21, the DOL addressed the question as to
how it was going to enforce compliance with the exemption. In its answer, the DOL stated that it had both
investigative and interpretive authority as to exemption compliance. For those plans covered by Title I of
ERISA, the DOL plans on investigating for compliance with the exemption and enforcing the protections
afforded under Title I (i.e., the statutory causes of action under ERISA §502).157 For IRAs and other nonTitle I plans, the DOL states that it has interpretive authority to determine whether the exemption conditions
have been satisfied and that it will transmit information to the IRS regarding the enforcement of Title II’s
excise tax. It is not clear how the DOL through its investigatory processes would be in a position to know
whether Title II’s plans are in compliance with the exemption. A question exists as to whether the DOL’s
ability under ERISA §502 to request documents in
connection to an investigation would be considered an
‘‘interpretation.’’158

D. Common Pitfalls for Investment
Advisers to Watch for in Complying
With PTE 2020-02
The following highlights common pitfalls that Financial Institutions and their Investment Professionals
may make, running afoul of the DOL’s final rules.159
Under the federal securities law, a fiduciary can have
its duty waived, whereas ERISA’s PTE rules impose
strict liability and require a fiduciary to satisfy the
conditions of the exemption in order to act.
1. Implied Recommendations
Financial advisers may not realize that a recommendation that is implied may nevertheless be subject
to the new exemption. For example, simply proposing
an investment strategy for a rollover IRA to a retirement investor for a fee will fall within the parameters
156

See also New Fiduciary Advice Exemption: PTE 2020-02
Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees Frequently
Asked Questions, Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 2021).
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See Groom Law Group, DOL Releases FAQs on PTE 202002, Foreshadows Future Activity on Investment Advice/(Apr. 16,
2021).
159
The author would like to thank attorneys Jeffrey Blumberg,
Joan Neri, Fred Reish, and Joshua Waldbeser of Faegre Drinker
for hosting a webinar which highlights these common mistakes in
complying with DOL PTE 2020-02, entitled DOL PTE 2020-02
Disclosures and Policies — Common Mistakes.
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of the DOL’s regulations, making the adviser an investment advice fiduciary. The DOL certainly believes
statements from the investment adviser, such as ‘‘If I
were you, I’d invest in the following . . .’’ involve an
implied recommendation. Hence to avoid that result,
advisers will have to draft their information in a more
general or objective format — with no implied recommendations. In the rollover context, information
should be more general and totally objective as to
pros and cons of making a distribution from a Title I
plan, as well as the legal consequences for rolling
such assets into an IRA. While practitioners will be
examining Interpretative Bulletin 96-1 to see what
constitutes education and not advisement, that bulletin was designed for participants in a 40(k) plan, but
not rollover decisions. But if the investment firms decide to go the educational route, in order to avoid fiduciary status, they will need to document their materials and supervise their advisers through ongoing
training.160
2. Rollovers Include More Than Plan to IRA
Transfers
Due to the expansive definition of a ‘‘plan’’ for
Title II’s fiduciary rules, financial advisers may think
that only rollovers from Title I plans to IRAs are covered, not realizing that the following are also covered
by the exemption: a rollover from a plan to another
plan; a rollover from an IRA to a plan; a rollover from
one IRA to another IRA; or a rollover from one type
of account to another. As to the latter rollover, the
DOL indicates that moving from a commission-based
account to a fee-based account is also covered as rollovers, but it doesn’t elaborate as to other types of accounts that could be covered. Hence, all five of these
types of rollovers are subject to the conditions of the
exemptions. It is unclear if an investor wishes to roll
from a traditional IRA to a Roth IRA, whether that advice covered or is it regarded as tax, and not investment, advice.
3. Meaning of IRA More Expansive Than
Realized
Advisers may not realize that the term ‘‘IRA’’ is defined more broadly than just Individual Retirement
Accounts and Individual Retirement Annuities, but
also include MSAs, HSAs, and Coverdell Education
Savings Accounts. Under Title II’s fiduciary rules, the
term ‘‘plan’’ includes:
• A retirement plan qualified under I.R.C.
§401(a) or plan described in I.R.C. §403(a);

• An IRA;
160
See Note 53, above, whereby FINRA cautioned investment
firms to supervise their advisers through training so that they do
not make an implied recommendation.
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• An Archer MSA;
• An HSA;
• A Coverdell education savings account; and
• A plan determined by the DOL to be described

in one of the plans noted above. This excludes
governmental plans, church plans (unless they
elect to be subject to the qualification rules of
I.R.C. §401(a)), and I.R.C. §457 plans.

4. Not Knowing When a Prohibited Transaction
Occurred
A prohibited transaction occurs when compensation
(e.g., advisory fees) is paid to the adviser or its financial firm as a result of ‘‘conflicted’’ recommendations.
Hence, financial advisers may not realize when a prohibited transaction has occurred when either they or
an affiliate of theirs receives compensation, and therefore, is in need of a PTE. The following are examples
of conflicted recommendations, which trigger the exemption:
• An adviser recommends to an IRA owner to
transfer his/her funds into an IRA managed by
the adviser (e.g., by using proprietary funds);

• An adviser makes a recommendation to a plan

or IRA regarding certain investments, such that
investing in those investment will result in a
revenue sharing payment or marketing allowance from the provider to the adviser;

• An adviser recommends to the plan that the ad-

viser or its financial institution could manage
the participants’ account; or

• An adviser recommends that the plan or IRA

invest in a proprietary investment product that
results in an investment management fee to an
affiliate of the adviser or its financial institution.

5. Not Knowing That Conflicts of Interest Must
Be Mitigated
The DOL’s PTE 2020-02 requires both the adviser
and his/her financial institution to mitigate any conflicts of interest. To achieve this, the financial institution must have a strict process in place for making the
type of recommendation it is making, and then must
supervise that process. This must be true, not only for
the financial institution, but also for its investment
professionals. For example, the adviser wishes to recommend to the IRA owner that he/she should roll
such monies into a different IRA. As the adviser will
draw upon more compensation if the rollover occurs,
he/she must document the process used in making
such the recommendation and the financial firms must
supervise its agents to assure the process is being fol-
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lowed. In this example, the following steps should be
considered by the investment adviser in the context of
a rollover from one IRA to another IRA:
• The adviser must collect sufficient information
to understand where the investor is relative to
retirement (e.g., is the investor still working
and thus, in the accumulation phase; alternatively, if the investor has retired, and thus, in
the deaccumulation phase, what other considerations should be examined on the part of the
adviser?).
• The adviser needs to secure information about
the original IRA, perhaps using the IRA owner’s quarterly statements, in order to ascertain
fees and services being charged to the IRA
owner’s account.
• Since the adviser is recommending a rollover
to another IRA (with the adviser’s firm), he/she
must consider what new investments and services that it could provide to the IRA owner.
• The adviser must then analyze the original
IRA’s statements to see how the investor has
directed the account in the past, so that he/she
can determine what investments, services, and
fees are available under the second IRA.
• With all the information combed above, the adviser must determine what is in the best interest of the investor. The reasons for recommending the rollover must be documented in writing,
beginning July 1, 2022.
6. Deficient Fiduciary Acknowledgments
Most of the disclosures required by PTE 2020-02
must be made before the time in which the transaction
occurs. One of these required disclosures is the fiduciary acknowledgment form, whereby the advisers
and their financial institutions, acknowledge that they
are fiduciaries for purposes of Title I of ERISA and/or
fiduciaries for purposes of Title II of ERISA. The
DOL provides model language that can be used,
which looks similar to the disclosure made under the
federal securities’ Form ADV.161 As the DOL permits
advisers and their Financial Institutions to use information disclosed to other federal agencies (e.g., the
SEC), Financial Institutions will be examining current
disclosure forms to see if they can used for purposes
of PTE 2020-02.
7. Assessing Reasonableness of Compensation
Paid
PTE 2020-02 requires, through its Impartial Conduct Standards, that the compensation received by the
161

Form ADV is the uniform form used by investment advisers to register with both the SEC and state securities authorities.

adviser and his/her financial firm cannot exceed reasonable compensation. The DOL intends to use a
market-based standard — one that compares the fees
received by the adviser and his/her financial institution for the services rendered to those fees assessed in
the marketplace.162 To comply with this requirement,
advisers and their financial firms will have to either
compare their fees to other advisers providing comparable services, or rely on benchmarking services.
Hence, financial institutions will need to devise policy
and procedures regarding their fee schedules. Note, in
this regard, the SEC’s view on the reasonableness of
compensation depart from the DOL’s view, as the
SEC simply requires the registered investment adviser
to disclose that comparable service may be available
from other advisers at lower costs.
8. Best Interest Process Requires More than the
‘‘Investor Prefers Me’’
Relying on the rationale that the ‘‘Investor Prefers
Me’’ is likely insufficient to meet the best interest
standard as it requires the adviser to know the investor’s risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and investment objectives in making a recommendation as
to investments. In turn the Financial Institution’s policies and procedures should reflect that the adviser has
adhered to this best interest standard.
9. Best Interest Process Requires Consideration of
All Costs
The adviser must understand that the best interest
standard requires the evaluation of all costs of the recommended investments (e.g., expense ratios), as well
as the cost of the adviser’s services. In the context of
a rollover recommendation, the adviser must analyze
the services, fees, and investment of each option (e.g.,
staying put in the employer plan or rolling into an
IRA) in ascertaining what is in the best interest of the
investor relative to his/her risk tolerance, investment
objectives, and financial circumstances.
10. Best Interest Process Requires Information
Regarding the Plan
In satisfying the documentation required for a recommended rollover from a plan to an IRA, the DOL
requires that the adviser and his/her related financial
institution make diligent and prudent efforts regarding
information about the investor’s existing employee
benefit plan. This would suggest that the adviser provide the investor with a full explanation as to why he/
she needs such information. If such information is not
162
Note the SEC’s position on reasonableness of compensation
is dramatically different. As long as a registered investment adviser discloses that services rendered are available through other
firms at a lower cost, the adviser has conformed to his fiduciary
duty for securities’ law purposes.
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otherwise available, the DOL allows the investor to
use alternative data sources, such as the plan’s Form
5500, as well as reliable benchmarks on the customary fees assessed by type and size of the plan in question. If the adviser relied upon this outside information, he/she should document and explain why the information was utilized.
11. Best Interest Process Requires Certain
Documentation
Advisers and their financial institutions will be required, as of July 1, 2022, to provide documentation
as to why a rollover recommendation was made, and
why it is in the best interest of the investor. Prior to
the July date, financial institutions should be developing the best interest processes and documenting such
processes

V. CONCLUSION
Due to the Fifth Circuit’s vacatur of the 2016 Fiduciary Rules, the DOL was forced to reinstate the 1975
investment advice fiduciary regulations, but had to reinterpret such regulations as it wished to expand the
universe of those who would be found to be investment advice fiduciaries. It made known its opinion in
the Preamble of the most recent exemption (PTE
2020-02), that it has changed its determination of
what is an investment recommendation (so as to include a rollover recommendation); expanded its notion of what is a regular basis needed to subject an
adviser as to who is an investment advice fiduciary
(allowing the rollover recommendation to be the start-
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ing point for such regular basis); and modified its notion of what constitutes a mutual understanding between the parties (prohibiting exculpatory clauses to
disclaim such understanding). The DOL will set forth
its new interpretation of an investment advice fiduciary in its regulations to be proposed, hopefully during 2022, which will be open for comment and discussion. It also will begin reinterpreting many of the
outstanding PTEs that provided for certain compensation to be paid to investment advice fiduciaries.163 As
its new PTE 2020-02 better aligns with the SEC’s
Regulation Best Interest, it’s likely not to prompt the
kind of fury that the financial community exhibited to
the 2016 Fiduciary Rules. However, much more disclosure and documentation is needed under PTE
2020-02 than under federal securities law. There is an
outstanding lawsuit challenging the DOL’s new rules,
so it will be important to see how that lawsuit is resolved.164 In the meantime, the financial community
appears to be gearing up to comply with the new
rules, which became effective as of February 1, 2022,
except for the disclosure requirements applicable to
rollover recommendations which have been further
extended until June 30, 2022.
163
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See Federation of Americans for Consumer Choice v. U.S.
Department of Labor, No. 3:22-cv-00243-K (filed N.D. Tex. Feb.
2, 2022). The case seeks to vacate the DOL’s interpretation of the
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